tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post5860001200190522590..comments2023-12-28T01:11:49.188-08:00Comments on Cum Lazaro: The legitimacy of rebellionLazarushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-19310408875679836082016-07-04T09:54:53.100-07:002016-07-04T09:54:53.100-07:00I've now replied to this in a blogpost http://...I've now replied to this in a blogpost http://cumlazaro.blogspot.co.uk/2016/07/the-legitimacy-of-rebellion-another-bite.htmlLazarushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-84249343751991898332016-06-13T07:52:09.225-07:002016-06-13T07:52:09.225-07:00Thanks for that. It raises a few questions for me:...Thanks for that. It raises a few questions for me: <br /><br />1. The great issue with seeking to establish legitimate authority in advance is that you are signalling your intention to revolt. Imagine North Korea rebels sought legitimacy from the Pope (or the UN) in advance, or sought to get signatures from a large number of officials - what action would the regime take as the news inevitably seeped out? The effect is to make revolt against tyranny extremely difficult, and the more effective the tyranny, the more difficult it is.<br /><br />2. This would make sense if the Church in general thought revolt always a bad thing. Aquinas says sedition (revolt by part of the state against another part) is always wrong, and in reply to the objection that "it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule...Therefore there can be sedition without mortal sin." Aquinas answers that there is "no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government." Thus the thing called by some "sedition" is not really sedition when it is (a) aimed at restoring the common good and (b) will not have worse effects than the existing government. There are two tests here to determine whether a revolt is sedition or not. <br /><br />3. Aquinas does say that sedition is like war (and by analogy, revolt that is just must also be). It is indeed reasonable to look at his other writing to determine the approach to sedition. But it cannot be simply supposed without argument that Just War Theory applies in all parts to sedition or rebellion. Without being an expert on this in any way, earlier medieval writers have certainly supposed that deposing tyrants is rather different from attacking another state. <br /><br />4. If we look at your example, the Declaration of Arbroath was in 1320. In 1306 Robert the Bruce was crowned King of Scots, after Edward had been recognised as king of Scotland the previous year by the Pope. There was ongoing war until Battle of Bannockburn in 1314. Based on that timeline, Robert was only attempting to establish his legitimate authority via the Declaration of Arbroath *after* he'd been in revolt for an extended period of time against the king the Pope had acknowledged. So was that prior revolt illegitimate, despite the long list of grievances the Declaration makes against the English monarchs? Is it really possible to declare an authority as legitimate retroactively? <br /><br />I'm more interested in the application of the principle in the general sphere that its' application to 1916, so I'll sideline that aspect, for now at least!<br /><br />CathyCathyhttp://www.irishphilosophy.comnoreply@blogger.com