tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post80701433783836836..comments2023-12-28T01:11:49.188-08:00Comments on Cum Lazaro: Natural Law and the Instrumentum Laboris on the FamilyLazarushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-84862008366460525582014-06-30T13:59:16.216-07:002014-06-30T13:59:16.216-07:00Fair enough! But that's (one) of my points: it...Fair enough! But that's (one) of my points: it's too easy to say that (as you did) that teleological reasoning about sex has been refuted when you take a few aspects out of context and then subject them to a philosophical approach that believes the underlying approach that generated those aspects is false. The battlefield should be the underlying approach -not the aspects derived from that approach. <br /><br />Completely sympathetic to the 'time constraints'! But, nevertheless, if the issues are going to be sorted, that's what's needed (even if as a matter of academic teamwork rather than individual effort). I'm certainly not claiming to do more than touch on some of the key issues, even if I think I'm going to go on for a quite a while on this...Lazarushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-46940709700787994452014-06-30T13:45:32.244-07:002014-06-30T13:45:32.244-07:00You are correct, my analysis of purpose is empiric...You are correct, my analysis of purpose is empiricist. So, I would argue that Thomistic reasoning regarding physical nature is irrational. I do not think things have 'purposes' beyond how they are actually used in the natural world. But then, I am also a Cartesian dualist, so even if it were shown that the body had x purpose, I would deny that that should limit my actions. Much in the same way that I would deny that finding the purpose of a tree to be x wouldn't prevent me from cutting it down and fashioning it to fit my will. Lol, we are so far apart in our way of understanding the world that debate is almost impossible. I've taken the time to read some of Feser's blog posts. I do not think the enormity of the task to explore this matter fully is within my time constraints. As Feser notes, the gulf between the mechanistic worldview, of which I am an adherrant, and your world view, is staggeringly large.Tomhttp://www.twitter.com/trlanghamnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-9734996612817696202014-06-30T13:08:25.020-07:002014-06-30T13:08:25.020-07:00Well, I was thinking along these lines. In broad t...Well, I was thinking along these lines. In broad terms, on a Thomist analysis, ideas in the mind are identical with the rational structures of reality: the process of abstraction by the agent intellect doesn't so much construct a rational picture of the world, so much as extract it. So the essence/nature/mental idea of a human being are identical.On an empiricist understanding, however, in general terms, ideas in the mind are constructions from sense data: if we have an idea of a substance (and (eg) Hume would argue we simply have a word without an idea) then it is a representation of reality rather than (part) of that reality itself.<br /><br />So, putting aside the details, ideas for a Thomist can achieve an identity with reality: we can think directly about reality. For an empiricist, certainly once we move from sensible qualities, there is a representational gap between our ideas and reality. I'm not sure when you say 'empirical' whether you accept the model of Thomistic perception, whether (say) you are adopting an empiricist model along the lines of Hume, or whether you just mean it in some vague, non-committed sense of 'having something to do with experience' (in which case we're simply postponing the evil day of having to go one way or t'other!). <br /><br />So the point is this. Your analysis of purpose appears to be empiricist: you make observations; you construct an hypothesis; you check how well it fits your observations. (That's the best you can do.) For a Thomist, ceteris paribus, you observe the object (human being) and extract the rational pattern from it that is the real structure of the object. Among other differences, eg, your 'insight' is essentially mediated by language. The grasping of the rational structure of the object in Thomist terms is not necessarily articulable into language.<br /><br />As I've said, a Thomist analysis of natural law isn't the only one and certainly isn't necessarily correct. But if you are going to deal with the conclusions of a self-confessedly Thomist analysis such as Feser's, you can't assume an empiricist theory of epistemology when he is explicitly rejecting this in coming to his conclusions. You need to tackle the underlying system directly (here, its epistemology). Specifically, tracking the history of evolution wouldn't give you the form/final cause of the human substance in Thomist terms.Lazarushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-17875397558865432622014-06-30T10:31:30.736-07:002014-06-30T10:31:30.736-07:00I look forward to reading your explanation of this...I look forward to reading your explanation of this matter.<br /><br />I was only adopting the language of Aquinas to try and argue on his terms, teleologically. I don't really see how disagreeing with his determination of what the 'final cause' of sex is, because of empirical observations, is adopting a non-Thomistic perception. I could equally have argued on the basis of assuming creation by a god; my observations of sex would be the same.Tomhttp://www.twitter.com/trlanghamnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-16938480189366787142014-06-30T06:46:01.792-07:002014-06-30T06:46:01.792-07:00/continued
To go a bit Wittgensteinian for a mome.../continued<br /><br />To go a bit Wittgensteinian for a moment, claims about the natural use of body parts have to be taken in context. There's a language game and it's embedded in a form of life. To rip out claims about the proper use of the body from that context is to misunderstand the nature of the claim. To slap claims about the function of genitalia into a background where function is determined (eg) by empiricist understandings of substance and evolutionary understandings of finality is put them in a language game they were never meant to fit into.<br /><br />I'm sure not all Catholic authors (particularly popular ones) put that as well as it should be put. Moreover, even those working within a broadly Aristotelian tradition will disagree about details, perhaps even important ones. But the idea that you can just take one small aspect of an approach/set of approaches, and then dismiss it without examining the background against which that aspect makes sense is wrongheaded. The main problems here are in a) the commonsense analysis of practical reason which makes the perception of the practically wise person the key to virtue; and b) the Thomistic analysis of the nature of a person as a substance with a form/final cause. Those are the bits you should be concentrating your fire on rather than the consequences of those views.Lazarushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-11869193324274488642014-06-30T06:45:00.791-07:002014-06-30T06:45:00.791-07:00Thanks for engaging on this, Tom.
I hope I'll...Thanks for engaging on this, Tom.<br /><br />I hope I'll deal with (most) of these points in the coming posts. But to pre-empt matters a little, you need to distinguish between (at least): a) the idea of natural law (as distinct from supernaturally revealed law); b) that understanding of natural law which is based on on Aristotelian/Thomistic principles; c) any particular argument offered within that Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition.<br /><br />Not all Catholic writers who rely on Natural Law as a concept are Aristotelians/Thomists. There is certainly no obligation on Catholics to accept Thomistic metaphysics as correct. As I've tried to suggest in this post, there is a context within which these arguments are set -primarily a background of everyday practical reasoning- without which any specific argument won't make sense. Now, I happen to think that Aristotle gets most of that everyday background correct (and that happens to fit in well with a privileging of Thomistic analysis that you do find in the Church) but, again, the details of Aristotle's analysis are not obligatory on the faithful.<br /><br />Now the real question is (as with most questions about the world) 'what is x?' -in this case, 'what is sex?' You've brought up the notion of the function of sex -which is certainly in keeping with a Thomistic 'teleological' analysis. (But note that, in itself, the focus on the question of 'what is sex for' is quite a significant concession to a specifically Thomistic approach in itself: in your position, I don't think I'd concede that much!) But let's stick with the Thomistic view which is that, by dint of formal and final causes, the question of 'what is x' is intimately linked to 'what x is for/oriented towards'. How one analyzes that question of finality is neither a) simply an 'empirical' matter; or b) exhausted by the evolutionary history. So if you are going to accept the Thomistic analysis of the nature of a substance being captured by its formal/final causes, you can't then adopt a non-Thomist perspective in assessing what that form/final cause is.<br /><br />To take Feser (and I assume we're talking about pp141ff of The Last Superstition), any morality based on the procreative function of sex is specifically done within his overarching theme: we need to go back to Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics. Indeed, he specifically says: 'Suppose, then, that things really do have final causes, including our various biological capacities.' Within that perspective (not empirical -unless you mean by that 'something to do with experience' without being tied down to empiricist philosophies of perception; not determined by the efficient causality of evolution) THEN his argument makes sense. (But it's that perspective you need to tackle.)<br /><br />Lazarushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09716412032074416331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5078331897510807942.post-53863618744466876832014-06-30T05:45:54.963-07:002014-06-30T05:45:54.963-07:00I thought I should comment as I (partly) provoked ...I thought I should comment as I (partly) provoked this. And it is good to have this discussion, as I have been hugely dissatisfied with all the natural law scholars on the topic of sex.<br /><br />I have to say, from the start, that from my reading anyway (people like Feser, and Budziszewski in "The meaning of sex") Natural Law scholars have focussed on the sexual organs in order to determine the function of sex, and that is certainly the focus that occurs in certain popular accounts of Natural Law (Robert Reilly's recent book, for instance).<br /><br />Now, of course I understand the principle of 'union' in the procreative sex (if I hear one more analogy to the digestive system I may, ironically, throw up). However, we are not talking about the matter of union, so much as what sex is for. For this we must look to the natural world and our closest ancestors. The conclusions regarding sex that Aristotle and Aquinas derived were all very well when looking at pigs and sheep, but fall short when looking at primates and humans. Aristotle, of course, being an idiot on matters empirical anyway (eg legs on flies). Looking at the natural world, of course we see that sexual organs arose and were used for reproduction! However, in the course of evolution in higher primates, sex has been exaptated for other functions, including dominance and group cohesion. There is no empirical sense in which these are not proper uses of sex, so for the Catholic church to declare that sex must be procreative in order to be "right ordered" is both empirically and scientifically false. In much the same way, eating and drinking in higher mammals, like humans, is not just a matter of sustenance, so demanding that eating be sustaining is irrational. Anyone who has ever gone wine tasting or eaten sweets can tell you that eating and drinking are matters of pleasure in humans!Tomhttps://twitter.com/trlanghamnoreply@blogger.com